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COMMENTS
An Obstacle Course to Court:
A First Look at Wyoming's Medical Review Panel Act
1
In response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis and
hence under pressure from doctors and the insurance industry, the 1986
Wyoming Legislature passed the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act (the
Act).' The bill was signed by the Governor and became effective on July
1, 1986. 3

The Act follows a current trend among state legislatures to enact a
series of so-called "tort reforms" in an attempt to balance the perceived
injustices of longstanding laws.4 This comment examines the Wyoming
Medical Review Panel Act and critically analyzes some of the Act's potential difficulties. Because the Act is in its infancy, some problems are yet
to be encountered. A look at the review panel experience in other jurisdictions, however, sheds light on what Wyoming can expect, both in terms
of substantive and procedural difficulties and the probable results of this
legislation. 5
THE WYOMING MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL

ACT

By its definitions the Act encompasses potential malpractice claims
against physicians, dentists or health care facilities such as sanatoriums
and nursing homes. 6 Under the Act's mandate, all claims against health
care providers must be addressed by a review panel before they can be
filed in court.'
The Director
The Attorney General or his designee serves as the director of the Act.8
The director does not sit on or vote in any panel but is the administrator
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
1. See Comment, MedicalMalpracticeInsurance Crisis: The Boys Who Cry "Wolf',
XXI LAND & WATER L. REV. 203 (1986).
2. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1501 to -1511 (Supp. 1986).
3. Id § 9-2-1506(a).
4. See Comment, Recent Medical MalpracticeLegislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL.
L. REV. 655 (1976).
5. A current list of jurisdictions which have some form of medical review panel includes: ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.536 (1979); AHiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-19b to -19f (1977 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6803-6814 (Supp.
1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.57 (1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 to -1013 (1979 & Supp. 1986);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-1012 to -1020 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (1983);

§§ 65-4901 to -4908 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977
& Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-2859 (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844(21 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41A.003
to .069 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1 to :10 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-14
to -24 (1986); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-29.1-021) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-14-12 to-16 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §98.01-581.1
KAN. STAT. ANN.

to .12 (1984 & Supp. 1986). This list does not include states which use court-annexed
arbitration.
6. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1503 (Supp. 1986).
7. Id § 9-2-1507(a).
8. Id § 9-2-1505(b).
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of the Act. He may promulgate regulations, select panelists and provide
for panelists' compensation.'
The director's chief substantive task is to select panelists. The panelists are selected from lists of submitted names. Within five days of receipt
of a claim, the director must notify the state licensing agency of the health
care provider involved and the Wyoming State Bar. 0 Then the licensing
agency and the Wyoming State Bar each provide the director with a list
of twelve proposed panelists." The director chooses two people from each
list to serve on the review panel for a given claim."
The Panel
Each panel which reviews malpractice claims is composed of five
members: two health care providers, two attorneys and a lay panelist who
can neither be an attorney, a health care provider nor an employee of a
health care provider. The four professional members of the panel are subject to challenge by the parties. Upon a party's affidavit stating a belief
that a panelist would not be impartial, the panelist is automatically disqualified. Each party may disqualify a maximum of three panelists.14 The
director makes a new selection upon disqualification of a panelist."
The lay panelist is chosen by the unanimous vote of the four professional panelists.1 Neither the Act nor the regulations" provide procedures
for when unanimity cannot be achieved. The panel then selects a chairman from among its five members to preside over panel proceedings. 8
All panel members must be residents of the state of Wyoming.' 9 Although
the director may disqualify any panelist "if the panelist feels his presence
on the panel would be inappropriate under the circumstances,"20 the
statute provides no procedures by which the parties may disqualify the
lay panelist.
The Claim and Answer
As previously mentioned, a claim must be heard by a review panel
before a plaintiff can proceed in a court action against a health care provider. The plaintiff must address the claim to the director in the form of
a signed statement setting out the conduct or omission constituting the
9. Id §§ 9-2-1505(b), -1508(b). The director does not set panelists' compensation; section 9-2-1505(c) sets panelist fees at $40.00 per hour.
10. Id. § 9-2-1508(b).
11. Id
12. Id The Act does not specifically say that a new review panel is drawn for each claim,
but the statutory scheme indicates this.
13. Id § 9-2-1508(a).
14. Id § 9-2-1508(d).
15. Id
16. Id § 9-2-1508(b).
17. MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL RULES, reprinted in IX Wyo. LAW. 26 (June 1986)
[hereinafter PANEL RULES].
18. WYo. STAT. ANN.

§ 9-2-1508(c) (Supp. 1986).

19. Id § 9-2-15081a).
20. Id § 9-2-1508(e).
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alleged malpractice." The claim must also authorize the release of all pertinent medical records to the panel for its privileged and confidential
review."
The health care provider must file an answer to the claim with the
director. The answer must be filed within thirty days after service of the
claim, and the answering party must also submit to review panel inspection of medical records. 23 These records do not include the findings or proceedings of peer review organizations. Peer
review findings are absolute4
ly privileged by the Wyoming Statutes.
Upon receipt of the claim by the director, the Act tolls the statute
of limitations for the malpractice action until thirty days after the panel's
decision is served on the claimant." Thus while the claim is pending with
the review panel, time to prepare for later litigation is not lost.
The Hearing
The hearing before the panel must take place within 120 days of the
director's receipt of the claim, "unless the director or the panel finds good
cause to delay the hearing. '26 If panel members deem it necessary, the
panel may also request a supplemental hearing which must be held within
thirty days of the original hearing.27 The Act calls for the hearing to be
"informal", without the constraints of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence
28
or the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act except when so specified.
The panel does have the power to subpoena witnesses at the hearing,2' 9
but there is no pre-hearing discovery authorized by the statute.
The panel must decide if there is: "(i) [siubstantial evidence that the
acts complained of occurred and that they constitute malpractice; and (ii)
[a] reasonable probability that the patient was injured as a result of the
acts complained of.""0 The decision of the panel is made by a majority
of its members.' The panel's written decision is served on both parties
as well as the state licensing board of the32 health care provider. The decision is in no way binding on any party.
More importantly, in a successive civil action no panel member may
be called to testify concerning panel deliberations, because all panel actions are strictly confidential2 All panel members and witnesses are
21. Id. § 9-2-1507(a).
22. Id
23. Id § 9-2-1507(d).
24. Id § 35-17-105.
25. Id § 9-2-1506(a).
26. Id § 9-2-1509(a).
27. Id § 9-2-1509(c).
28. Id § 9-2-1509(b). The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act only applies to the
Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act in the promulgation of regulations, id § 9-2-1505(b),
and the subpoenaing of witnesses, id § 9-2-1509(b).
29. Id § 9-2-1509(b).
30. Id § 9-2-1510(a).
31. Id § 9-2-1510(b).
32. Id

§ 9-2-1510.

33. Id § 9-2-1511(a), -(b).
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absolutely immune from civil actions relating to service on the panel. 4
Further, the panel's decision is not admissible as evidence.3 5
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES

Other jurisdictions have experienced some difficulties with legislation
similar to the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act. The state of Montana
has had a mandatory medical review panel act since 1977.16 The constitutionality of that act was challenged in the case of Linder v. Smith.3 7 Linder
had been injured while under the care of a physician and attempted to
file a medical malpractice lawsuit. The suit was dismissed on the ground
that Linder had not first filed a claim with the review panel, as mandated
by the Montana act. 38 Linder then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the constitutionality of the act. He alleged inter
alia that the review panel denied his right of access to the courts as
guaranteed by the Montana constitution. 9 In rejecting this argument,
the Montana Supreme Court held that the right of access to the courts
is not a fundamental right and that the purpose of the legislation was
40
rationally related to the perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis.
In a subsequent case not dealing with Montana's medical review
panel,' 4 the same court held that the right to bring a civil action for personal injuries is a fundamental right and that the statutory scheme affecting that right "must be measured by a strict scrutiny test."4 2 This
suggests that, had Linder framed his complaint in the declaratory judgment action differently, for example, as a right to file a civil action for
personal injuries, the court may have had a more difficult time overcoming his argument. It also raises the question of how the court reasonably
differentiated between the right of access to the courts and the right to
file a civil action for personal injuries.
The argument that mandatory medical review panels deny free access
to the courts has been addressed by virtually every state which has passed
screening panel legislation. The majority of jurisdictions have upheld the
legislation in the face of this argument.4 3 However, some of the jurisdictions which have declared medical screening panels to be constitutional
have language in their constitutions which differs from that found in
Wyoming's constitution." Still other states which have upheld the legisla34. Id. § 9-2-1506(b).
35. Id § 9-2-1511(c).
36. The Montana Medical Legal Panel Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1985).
37. 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981).
38. Id at 1188.
39. Id at 1190.
40. Id at 1190-91.
41. White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983.
42. Id at 1274-75.
43. Linder, 629 P.2d at 1190.
44. See, e.g., AIz. CONST. art. II, § 110 (administered openly and without unnecessary
delay); ALASKA CONST. art. I (no such provision); MD. CONST. art. 19; NEv. CONST. art. I (no
such provision).
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tion have medical screening
45 panels which initiate proceedings subsequent
to the filing of a lawsuit.
A minority of jurisdictions have declared medical review panels to be
unconstitutional. 46 The argument chiefly accepted has been the Linder
47
position that mandatory screening panels deny free access to the courts.
The state of Missouri has declared its medical screening panel act unconstitutional for this reason.48 The case revolved around the actions of
a circuit court judge for the city of St. Louis, Carl Gaertner. A minor and
her parents had filed a malpractice action against a physician and a
children's hospital. Judge Gaertner overruled a defense motion for dismissal" for noncompliance with Missouri's new medical review panel act. 0
A provisional writ of prohibition was issued against Judge Gaertner, but
the Missouri Supreme Court vindicated the judge, quashed the writ and
declared the entire act unconstitutional.'
In so doing the court said that:
[tihe right of access to the courts is said to trace back to the Magna
Charta. It has been held to be an aspect of the right to petition
the government contained in the first amendment to the United
States Constitution. Most importantly it is explicitly preserved
in the Constitution of Missouri.
We hold that Chapter 538 violates Art. I, § 14 of the Constitution of Missouri and must be held invalid for that reason.52
The Declaration of Rights, Article I of the Wyoming Constitution,
states that "[a]ll courts shall be open and every person for an injury done
to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without
sale, denial or delay.""3 Since by its own terms the Wyoming Medical
Review Panel Act is nonbinding on the parties, it cannot be argued that
the panel's actions constitute "the administration of justice." The delay
caused by the imposition of the review panel is substantial. The act itself
envisions a delay of at least four months to complete the review panel
process.5 ' Statistics from the state of Montana show that in 1984 it took
an average of 144 days, well over four months, for the review panel to
45. See, e.g., N.Y. Jun. LAW § 148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, §§ 2-1012 to - 1020 (Supp. 1986).
46. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980); State ex reL Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976).
47. E.g., Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980); State ex rel Cardinal
Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979).
48. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 110.

49. Id. at 108.
50. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 538.010 to .080 (Supp. 1976).
51. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 110-11.

52. Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
53. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
54. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1509(a) (Supp. 1986).
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dispose of a claim. 55 If a comparable hearing process occurs in Wyoming,"
review panels taking up to 150 days or more may be common. Such a
lengthy delay in getting to court may also constitute an absolute denial
of court access in that the entire review panel process, although mandatory, is not subject to appellate review.
As previously stated, the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act tolls
the statute of limitations during the review panel process. However, this
does not answer the constitutional question of undue delay. A potential
lengthy delay is still present regardless of the fact that the statute of
limitations is not running. Thus in the extreme situation where the head
of a household with little or no insurance has been injured at the hands
of a negligent malpractitioner, going through the review panel process
could bring about utter financial ruin. Such a scenario has been depicted
by at least one commentator, and is well within the realm of possibility. 17
The Wyoming Supreme Court already faces constitutional challenges
to the medical review panel act. At least one challenge to the Act has been
mounted in the form of a declaratory judgment action brought in the
Wyoming District Court for Albany County.58 The case has been certified
to the Wyoming Supreme Court and should be decided sometime this year.
Aside from the potential constitutional difficulty, the Wyoming act
is fraught with procedural problems and loopholes. These could lead to
inequitable manipulation of the process or additional delays. For example, the Act calls for all panelists to be residents of the state. 59 Section
9-2-1508(a) states that:
[i]f feasible one (1) member of the panel shall be from the health
care provider's profession or specialty. In those cases where the
theory of respondeat superior or some other derivative theory of
recovery is employed, if feasible one (1) member shall be from the
health care provider's profession or specialty and one (1) member
shall be from the profession or specialty of the health care pro60
vider named as employer, master or principal.
Attempting to find a specialist in the health care provider's field or waiting
until a specialist can attend a hearing could well build additional delays
into an already torpid system. It is possible that Wyoming's rural char55. G. ZINs, MONTANA MEDICAL-LEGAL PANEL 1977-1985: REPORT OF THE PANEL 11
(Aug. 1986) (copy on file at Land & Water Law Review office).
56. In a few respects, the Montana Medical Legal Panel Act, supra note 36, differs from
Wyoming's Act: the Montana statute is considerably longer, it is administered through the
Montana Supreme Court and funded by a surcharge on health care providers. The substantive provisions of the Wyoming and Montana acts, however, are nearly identical: a claimant
must go through the panel process before filing a lawsuit; the panel is composed of both
attorneys and physicians and the panel's decisions are not binding nor admissible in evidence.
Thus the hearing process is nearly the same in both states.
57. Stanfield, An Empty and CruelPromise,7 COFFEE-HOUSE NEWSLETTER 1 (Summer
1986).
58. Hoem v. State, No. 87-41 (Wyo. filed Feb. 4, 1987).
59. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1508(a) (Supp. 1986).
60. Id
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acter and low population may cause further delays in the panel process.
Other sparsely populated states such as Idaho, Nebraska and North
Dakota have experienced lengthy panel delays for this reason."1 Also, many
panels because of the frespecialists have complained of overwork on the
2
quency with which they are called to serve.6
Even though Section 9-2-1508(a) is not mandatory, the problem is that,
if specialists in a given field are not called upon to serve on the panels,
the effectiveness and accuracy of panel determinations may be significantly reduced. In such a situation neither the prospective plaintiff's claim
nor the health care provider's defense may be given adequate consideration.
The listing and selection of panelists also pose potential problems. The
Wyoming State Bar and the licensing agency of the health care provider
compile the lists of attorneys and physicians who may serve as panelists. 3
Any member of the state bar can ask to be on the list of prospective
panelists. It is conceivable that the list given to the director could contain a substantial number of defense bar or insurance company lawyers.
Conversely, the medical professional list could contain doctors who frequently serve as plaintiff's expert witnesses in malpractice litigation. In
either case, the parties may not get a fair and impartial hearing.
Even if the lists of potential panelists do represent an adequate crosssection of attorneys and health care providers, the unfettered discretion
placed in the director's hands could lead to unfavorable results. Under
the statute the director is not forced to observe any criteria for selection
of the panelists ' A biased director could select panelists whom he thinks
may render a decision favorable to the director's viewpoint. Even upon
disqualification
the replacement panelists are again selected by the direc5
tor.
The Act's implementing regulations give no further guidance regarding panel selection criteria. In fact, the regulations are drafted by the director and are not subject to approval by the Wyoming Supreme Court. 66
The Montana Act mandates that regulations passed pursuant to the statute be subject to supreme court veto.2 The state of Montana has attempted to check the director's power by having the supreme court administer
the panel. 8 Wyoming would be wise to place this quasi-judicial proceeding
under supreme court supervision.
61. Carlin, Screening Panels-Do We Need a Second Opinion? 9 LEGAL ASPECTS OF
6 (Aug. 1981).
62. Id.
63. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1508(b) (Supp. 1986).
64. Id
65. Id § 9-2-1508(d).
66. Id § 9-2-1505(b).
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-204 (1985). The author does not suggest that the current
director of the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act is biased or unfair, but only points out
that the director, a political appointee, wields an excessive amount of power.
68. Id § 27-6-104.

MEDICAL PRACTICE
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At least one commentator has objected to the Wyoming Act, claiming that the standard of proof borne by a claimant in the panel hearing
is greater than the burden borne by a plaintiff in court.6 9 The act calls
for the panel to find "substantial evidence" that the act or acts occurred. 0
Of course, a plaintiff's burden in a civil case is one of a preponderance
of the evidence. Standards of clear and convincing evidence or of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt are not applicable to medical malpractice cases.
The term "substantial evidence" is not defined by the statute." Substantial evidence is defined in the regulations as:
such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to make a finding of fact. It may be less than
the weight of the evidence but it cannot be clearly contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. More is required than a mere
scintilla of evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact to be
established.72
A cursory reading of these words indicates that less than a preponderance
of the evidence is required. However, the phrase "[ilt may be less than
the weight of the evidence"" raises more questions than it answers. This
could mean that if evidence on both sides of the case is counterbalanced,
"substantial evidence" may be less than one-half. If this is the case
then
the drafters of the regulations should have plainly said, "it may be less
than a preponderanceof the evidence." Failure to use this standard, wellunderstood legal concept may lead to future interpretational problems.
Although the substantial evidence standard is generally well understood
on the level of appellate review, it may be questionable that it has the
same meaning at an evidentiary hearing. One can also question whether
or not it is proper to use an appellate standard of review at an evidentiary hearing.
WILL THE

AcT

FULFILL ITS PURPOSES?

Perhaps the most serious problem with the Wyoming Medical Review
Panel Act is that it may not fulfill its professed purposes. One such purpose is to prevent the filing of spurious claims. 74 Yet the Act also provides that "[t]he panel's decision is not binding upon any party."7 5 It seems
nearly impossible to reconcile these two provisions. By the act's own terms
a claimant who receives a negative decision from the review panel can still
proceed in court against the health care provider. Conversely, a health
care provider found liable by the panel can still refuse settlement and proceed with its defense. In these situations of inflexible parties, the money
69. Stanfield, supra note 57, at 4.
70. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1510(a).
71. Id- § 9-2-1503.
72. PANEL RULES, supra note 17, ch. 1, § 3(a)(xi), at 29.
73. Id.
74. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1502.
75. Id. § 9-2-1510(d).
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and time savings envisioned by the drafters of the Act is not only lost
but is compounded by the additional expense and delay of the review panel.
Neither party can introduce any evidence of the panel's findings in
court, nor can they call any panel member to testify about the panel's
deliberations.16 Thus, although the drafters of the law did not wish to have
it declared unconstitutional as an invasion on the province of the jury,
any teeth which the Act might have had were pulled before it left the
senate chambers.
Since the Act was passed in the wake of a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, its ultimate goal is to slow the increase in malpractice premiums. One way to reduce premiums is to promote the early settlement or disposal of claims, thus avoiding long and costly trials. This
is the other express purpose of the Act.17 However, legal scholars and
judges have been critical of the inducement to settle which review panels
purport to create. Consider the remarks of a New York judge who handled malpractice cases both before and after New York passed its mandatory screening panel act:
Plaintiffs who have received a unanimous panel recommendation
have been notorious in demanding extremely high settlements and
in proceeding to trial with increased determination to carry the
case to verdict or costly settlement. Concomitantly, where defendants have received a unanimous finding of no liability, they have
been rarely willing to discuss settlement."
Thus, in some jurisdictions, the review panel experience has been an
abysmal failure. In Rhode Island the mandatory review panels had been
unable to secure early settlement or disposal of claims. Until the Rhode
Island Act was declared unconstitutional," the screening panels had only
resolved 57 of 266 controversies."0
The state of Montana has had its screening panel act in place for nine
years. Statistics from this jurisdiction indicate that often the review panels
do not promote early claim settlement. Through 1985, six percent of all
Montana claims resulted in a tie vote of the panel.8' Only sixty-one percent of all claims filed against health care providers resulted in a unanimous vote of the panel.8 2 The tie vote is precluded in Wyoming because
five members sit on each convened panel. 83 If these statistics from our
northern neighbor hold true for Wyoming, up to four out of ten panels
could have substantial internal disagreement over liability. With panelists
straddling each side of the fence, it is difficult to see how such a time consuming process can promote effective settlement.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

I& §§ 9-2-1511(b), -(c).
Id. § 9-2-1502.
1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1.07, at 1-28 (1986).
Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 78, 1.07, at 1-27.
G. ZINS, supra note 55, at 5.
Id
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1508(a) (Supp. 1986).
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These statistics demonstrate that reasonable minds can differ over
facts presented to them. In such cases it fits our American system of civil
justice to allow juries of peers to make the ultimate decision, not to place
such determinations in the hands of medical and legal professionals.
"Tort reforms" such as mandatory medical review panels were legis-

lated in response to an alleged medical malpractice insurance rate crisis.4

It logically follows that if malpractice lawsuit filings decrease with the
imposition of review panels and other "tort reforms", a somewhat analogous decrease in malpractice insurance rates should follow. Such has not
been the case. Nationwide, a United States Senate committee has acknowledged that malpractice premiums have risen 73% from 1975 to 1982.85
This is despite the fact that over thirty states have passed some form
of "tort reform" in the mid- 1970's." Such statistics suggest that although
mandatory review panels and other "tort reforms" may have reduced the
number of malpractice cases filed, they may not have succeeded in reducing or even slowing the increase of medical malpractice premiums.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Recent innovations in the court system may be applicable to malpractice litigation. These techniques fall under the general rubric of "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR)9 7
One such method which may be well suited to malpractice litigation
is the summary jury trial. This is a non-binding process which may be
utilized under both the Federal- and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.89 It has been seldom used in the past, but recently federal courts
in Montana and other jurisdictions have held summary trials either by
the bench or a jury. Many cases have been disposed of with positive and
cost saving results for both litigants.90
The format of a summary trial is similar to that of a traditional civil
trial. Introductory remarks are made by the judge, who then explains the
summary trial process to the venire panel. The lawyers for each party will
have interviewed witnesses and will have been asked to condense the evidence and present it in a narrative form. Prolonged voir dire of the potential jurors is discouraged, and counsel are asked to provide limited voir
dire questions in advance. The jury is empaneled with full knowledge of
the summary trial process, yet members do not know that their decision
84. See Comment, supra note 1, at 203-05.
85. Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice:HearingBefore the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984) (statement of Patricia
Danzon, Ph.D.). At the same time, doctors fees and hospital bed fees have increased even
more than malpractice premiums. Id.
86. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 78, ch. 1.
87. For an excellent treatment of ADR, see 69 JUDICATURE 253-314 (1986).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).

89. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 16.

90. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative to Resolving Disputes, 69
JUDICATURE

286, 290 (1986).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/15

10

Fisch: An Obstacle Course to Court: A First Look at Wyoming's Medical Re
1987

COMMENTS

is nonbinding. Depending on the complexity of the case and the number
of parties involved, each counsel is allotted a fixed time for case presentation. This can range from one to three hours or more, which is split up
into time limits for presentation, rebuttal and surrebuttal.9 1
After a verdict is reached, the jurors are often polled on the quality
of the litigants' arguments and positions. This is a springboard toward
settlement because each party can evaluate the case with the assistance
92
of detached and neutral observers.
The variations and modifications available under the summary jury
trial are endless. In an extremely technical case where expert testimony
is absolutely required, the judge could limit each party to one expert
witness in the summary trial. The process is adaptable and should be
strongly advocated by the judge in medical malpractice cases as well as
any other complex or lengthy litigation.
Even though both the summary jury trial and the actions of the panel
are nonbinding, the summary jury trial may be preferable for at least two
reasons. First, the summary jury trial is a substantive portion of the lawsuit; it is undertaken after binding discovery has occurred. This makes
for a meaningful and informed summary trial which then serves as a strong
springboard toward settlement negotiations. Without the benefit of discovery in the review panels, the inducement to settle is diminished because
it becomes more difficult to adequately evaluate the merits of a claim or
defense. Conversely, if discovery procedures are introduced into the review
panel process, then a claimant is further delayed in even being able to
file a malpractice action.
The other reason to prefer the summary jury trial is that it takes place
before a duly empaneled jury. The reactions of the summary jury will likely
be very similar to those of a jury in a full-scale civil trial. However, the
reactions of four professionals and one layman may not be a very accurate
barometer to forecast damages awarded by a jury. The damage assessments of the summary jury will more adequately reflect the amount of
a binding verdict and therefore promote equitable yet serious settlement
negotiations.
The architect of the summary jury trial, Judge Thomas Lambros 93 has
reported that "virtually all of more than 100 suits handled through this
method have been concluded without the need of a full trial."9' These views
were echoed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which debated the merits of ADR in our court system. The Conference endorsed
91.
92.
93.
Ohio.
94.

Id at 288-89.
Id at 289-90.
Thomas D. Lambros is a United States District Judge in the Northern District of
Lambros, supra note 90, at 290.
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the "use of summary jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury
cases. "91
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act was passed as an effort to
stem rising malpractice costs. The Wyoming Legislature, however, may
the Act has been
not be too certain about its actions, because the
96 repeal of
debated only six months after its passage.
In many cases the Act may not fulfill its purposes of screening out
frivolous claims or promoting early settlement. Other states which have
passed such legislation have not seen the anticipated reduction in medical
malpractice insurance rates. If the Act should be kept at all, it needs to
be under the supervision of the Wyoming Supreme Court, as Montana
has done.
Wyoming has taken a step in the wrong direction with the imposition
of mandatory medical review panels. We need to have faith in our court
system that it will work to protect both victims of malpractice and physicians who practice medicine with a high degree of skill. The civil justice
system should not be stagnant, however, and should seek to improve itself
with the use of new yet proven techniques.
FREDRICK LEE FISCH

95. Id
96. House Bill No. 176, 49th Legis., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1987) (Legislative Serv. Office
No. 87LSO-0571.01).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/15

12

